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June  1987 Abstract 
In  this paper,  causal  relations among  inflation,  the debt-equity 
ratio,  Tobin's q,  and  investment  are examined.  The  hypotheses  that are 
tested are:  a)  that inflation is structurally neutral with respect to 
investment  and  q,  but not the debt-equity ratio;  b)  that there is 
instantaneous  causality between  inflation and  the debt-equity ratio, 
between  inflation and  q,  between  inflation and  investment  and  between  q 
and  investment;  c)  that there  is  no feedback  from the vector comprised of 
inflation and  the debt-equity ratio to  the vector comprised  of q and 
investment;  and  dl that there  is  no  short-run feedback from inflation to 
the debt-equity ratio, from inflation to  q,  or from inflation to 
investment.  I  also test for Granger-causality from q to  inflation,  from 
the debt-equity ratio to  inflation,  and  from investment  to  inflation. 
In  the introductory section of this paper,  methods  for analyzing the 
impact of inflation on financial markets  are discussed.  In  section 11, 
theoretical  and  empirical  studies that describe relations among 
inflation, financial markets,  and  investment  are reviewed.  In  section 
111,  a model  is  presented and  in  section IV the model's predictions of 
causal  relations are discussed.  Section V reports methods  employed  in 
the essay.  Section VI describes  the empirical results.  In  section VII, 
findings  are  interpreted and  conclusions  for future research are 
discussed. Introduction 
The  conjunction of high inflation rates,  poor  investment performance, 
low q,  and  high debt-equity ratios in  the late 1960s  and  early 1970s  led 
to numerous  studies of the impact  of inflation on  financial markets  and 
investment.  None  of these  studies,  however,  has  distinguished 
empirically between  long- and  short-run effects of inflation. 
There  are a variety of theoretical reasons  why  the  short-run relation 
between  inflation and  financial variables may  differ from the  long-run 
relation.  According  to  Modigliani  and  Cohn  (19791,  investors may  learn 
to incorporate  inflation in  their valuations of  equities correctly. 
Summers  (1983)  develops  a theoretical model  of Tobin's q that shows  how 
the short-run relation between  inflation and  q depends  on  the sources of 
the shocks  to inflation.  In  addition,  dynamic  theories of investment 
often yield ambiguous  predictions regarding the short-run responses  of 
endogenous  variables to  shocks  (for example  see  Brock  and  Turnovsky 
11981  I). 
In  this paper,  a general  equilibrium model  of investment  and 
financial structure is  presented.  Firms  choose  a higher debt-equity 
ratio  given higher  inflation since nominal  interest payments  may  be 
deducted from taxable  income  by  corporations.  An  interior solution for 
the debt-equity ratio  arises from a combination of  an  agency  cost of  debt 
and  a tax advantage  of  debt.  The  comparative  statics results and 
optimality conditions of the model  imply a set of  predictions regarding 
relations among  contemporaneous  and  lagged  values of  q,  the debt-equity 
ratio, inflation, and  investment. The  influences of lagged and  current values  are disentangled by 
estimating measures  of  Granger-causality and  instantaneous  causality. 
The  long- and  short-run effects of inflation on  q,  on  the debt-equity 
ratio,  and  on  investment  are tested by  estimating measures  of  feedback  at 
various frequencies.  Although q in  theory incorporates all information 
relevant for investment,  given potential problems  with measuring q it  may 
be  useful  to  focus instead on  the role of financial structure in linking 
inflation to  investment. Related Literature 
Theoretical  analyses of the impact of inflation on financial markets 
generally focus on either q or  the cost of capital as  the channel  through 
which  inflation affects investment.  Theoretical  analyses of the effects 
of inflation on q have  been  conducted  by Summers  (1980,  1983).  Summers 
(1980)  incorporates inflation in  a deterministic q model.  Summers  (1983) 
develops a  stochastic q model.  In  neither case  is  there a role for 
financial structure.  As  in  the q models  developed  by  Hayashi  (1982)  and 
Yoshikawa  (19801,  in  Summers'  models  q incorporates all information 
relevant to  investment  decisions.  If inflation affects financial 
structure and  the cost of  capital, it  will affect q and  thus  investment. 
Theoretical  analyses  of  the impact of inflation on financial 
structure have  been  reported by  Cordes  and  Sheffrin  (19831,  Gordon  and 
Malkiel  (1981),  and  Lewellen and  McConnell  (1979).  These  analyses  imply 
that higher  inflation rates are associated with higher debt-equity ratios 
since corporate  interest deductions are based on nominal  rather than on 
real interest payments. 
Summers  (1983)  offers the only analysis of the impact of inflation on 
financial markets  distinguishing between  long-  and  short-run effects.  He 
isolates the long-run effect of inflation on  interest rates and  equity 
returns,  using a band-spectral  technique  suggested by  Engle  (1974).  He 
finds that inflation is  not incorporated in  equity returns at low 
frequencies  so as  to compensate  stockholders  in  real terms. 
The  analysis of  feedback (causality)  has  been  developed by Geweke 
(1982a,1986).  Linear dependence  between  two  time series,  Xt and  Y,, is  equal  to  the sum  of  feedback  from X,  to  Y,,  feedback  from Y,  to 
X,,  and  instantaneous  feedback  between  X,  and  Y,.  The  existence of 
feedback  from X,  to  Y,  is  equivalent to  the existence of 
Granger-causality from X,  to  Yt.  There  is instantaneous  causality 
(instantaneous  feedback)  between  X,  and  Y,  if they are 
contemporaneously  correlated after the effects of  past values of  both 
variables have  been  removed.  The  directional  feedback measures  (feedback 
from  X,  to  Y,,  or from Y,  to  Xt> can  be  decomposed  by  frequency 
to  yield empirical  counterparts  to  long-  and  short-run feedback. 
Low-frequency  feedback  corresponds  to  long-run effects.  Absence  of 
feedback  from  X,  to  Y,  at zero frequency  is  equivalent to  the 
structural neutrality of  X,  with respect to  Y,  and  implies that the 
comparative  statics multiplier of X,  with respect  to  Y,  is zero. The  Model 
The  Consumer 
The  infinitely-lived representative consumer  maximizes  the present 
discounted value of utility.  Utility is a  function of consumption and 
real balances.  Formally,  the consumer's objective is to  choose  the 
sequence 
w  -I3 t 
C11  MAX  Sexp  U(ct,mt)dt 
0 
subject to 
-8t  -8  t 
131 lim  exp  bt  >  0,  lim  exp  ztE,  >  0  and 
t-  t  +a 
C41  B(0)  =  Bo,  E(O>  =  Eo,  M(0)  =  Mo, 
where 
ct  =  real private consumption 
p:  =  instantaneous anticipated rate of inflation 
B,  =  nominal  corporate bonds 
b,  =  real corporate bonds;  =  Bt/P, 
M,  =  nominal  money  balances 
m,  =  real balances;  m,  =  Mt/Pt 
I3  =  rate of time preference 
w,  =  real  wage  rate 8,  =  real employment 
st  =  nominal  ?nterest rate on corporate bonds 
Divt  =  real dividends 
dt  =  dividend payout rate; dt  =  Divt/ztEt 
zt  =  relative price of equity in terms of output 
Et  =  the number of shares of equity 
8  =  the rate of return on consumption; 8 =  B - u,,~/u, 
't  =  the lump sum tax 
qt  =  shadow price of physical capital  (Tobin's q) 
pt  =  the growth rate of real  balances; p =  m/m 
Brock and Turnovksy (1981) discuss how transactions costs may imply that 
money appears in the utility function.  I assume U,  >  0  and sign(U,)  = 
sign(m*  - m)  where m* is the satiation level of  real  balances  (see  Friedman 
C19691). 
Expression  C21 indicates that the representative consumer makes 
consumption expenditures, purchases bonds, demands additional  equity shares, 
and accumulates real  balances.  The consumer receives real  income in the form 
of wage payments, interest payments and dividends.  Inflation reduces the real 
value of debt and money holdings.  I assume perfect competition, all 
expectations or  forecasts are fulfilled, and all  markets clear.  Expression 
C31 provides bounds on debt and equity. Expression  C41 provides initial 
conditions for debt, equity, and money.  I assume that firms determine the 
amount of labor demanded. 
Since the consumer is concerned with real rates of  return on debt and 
equity, both debt and equity will  be held only if  their real rates of return 
are equal.  This equality is given by expression  C51 where 8  is the rate of return on consumption; 8  =  13  - U,,;IU,. 
C51  s -  pa =  8  =  d +  ZIZ. 
The Firm 
The representative firm maximizes the market value of debt plus equity. 
The firm is characterized by this objective and by expressions C61 -  C111. 
C81 n =  sb +  T,  Cy - wl  - sb - Y(I,K>l +  RE +  a(X)b  +  DIV 
ClOl K(0)  =  KO, ES(0)  =  Eo,  B(0)  =  Bo 
b 
Clll I =  RE +  b +  p
ab 
where 
p:  =  instantaneous anticipated rate of  inflation 
Bt  =  nominal  corporate bonds 
bt  =  real  corporate bonds; bt  =  B,lP, 
13  =  rate of time preference 
wt  =  real  wage rate 
Ct  =  real  employment 
st  =  nominal  interest rate on corporate bonds 
Divt =  real  dividends 
dt  =  dividend payout rate; dt  =  Divt/ztEt 
zt  =  relative price of equity in terms of output E,  =  the number  of shares  of  equity 
It =  real  investment expenditures 
Kt  =  real  stock of physical  capital 
Tt  =  the cost of capital as  derived in  the text 
yt  =  the cash  flow of the firm 
y,  =  real output 
II,  =  real gross  profits 
Y(I,K)  =  real adjustment cost from investment 
T  =  corporate profits tax rate 
RE,  =  retained earnings 
X,  =  the debt  to  equity ratio;  X =  b/zE 
a(X)b  =  cost of  maintaining the bond  portfolio 
6  =  the rate of  depreciation of  the physical  capital  stock 
The  firm  maximizes  the market  value of debt plus equity rather than just 
the market  value of  equity.  Bond  covenants  and  other restrictions on  the real 
and  financial activities of the firm  are assumed  to  force the firm to  take 
into account  the effect of its decisions on  the market  value of  debt.  Without 
some  mechanism  to  reconcile the divergent interests of stockholders  and 
bondholders,  the firm's objective may  not be  well  defined.  Such  is the case, 
for  example,  if bankruptcy risk influences  the prices of the implicit 
Arrow-Debreu  securi  ties (see  Auerbach  C19821,  p. 53). 
The  term a(X)b  in  expression  C81  is  an  agency  cost due  to  bond  covenants 
limiting both the real and  financial activities of  the firm.  It is  assumed 
that a(0)  =  0,  a10  >  0,  and  a"()  >  0.  As  the debt-equity ratio  rises,  the 
covenants  tighten since bondholders  are at greater risk.  The  tightening of the covenants  implies greater costs  to  the firm.  The  combination of this agency 
cost with the tax deductibility of interest payments  yields an  interior 
solution for the debt-equity ratio. 
Y(I,K>  denotes  the real cost to  adjusting the capital stock.  Both  the 
production function and  the adjustment  cost function are linearly 
homogeneous.  The  production function exhibits positive but diminishing 
marginal  productivities.  It is  also assumed  that the adjustment  cost function 
can  be  written as  h(I/K>I and  has  the following properties:  h(O> =  0,  hl(O>  > 
0,  and  2h1(I/K>  +  (I/K)hl(I/K>  >  0.  Thus,  the total installation cost  h(I/K)I 
is convex,  attaining its minimum  when  I=O.  Expression C71  defines real gross 
profits as  revenue,  minus  the wage  bill and  adjustment costs of  investing. 
Expression  [81 indicates that gross  profits are  split among  interest,  taxes, 
retained earnings,  dividends,  and  the leverage related cost,  a(X>b. 
Expression  [91 indicates that investment  either increases  the capital 
stock or replaces  worn-out capital.  Expression  ClOl states initial conditions 
on  the capital stock,  the bond  supply,  and  the equity supply.  Expression  Clll 
indicates that gross  investment must  be  financed either through retained 
earnings,  debt  issue,  or the decline in  the real value of outstanding 
debt. '  It  is  assumed  that no additional equity is issued. 
Manipulation of  equalities C61 - [Ill,  together  with expression  C51, 
yields a differential equation in  the value of the firm  that can  be  solved, 
subject to  a transversality condition,  to  yield expression C121. t 
-Sr(z)d.r: 
Q)  0 
El21  Vo =  bo +  zoEo  =  S  exp  y(t) dt 
0 
r  and  y  are defined as  follows: 
Formally,  the  firm's problem  is  to  choose  {  Kt, lt,  bt ) 
t=CO,Q)> 
so  to  maximize  Vo. 
The  Government 
The  government's  income  statement  identity is: 
C151  +  p
am  +  T,  Cy  -  wl  - 'Y(I,K)  - sbl +  T  =  g 
The  government  sets  the corporate  tax rate (T,),  the money  growth rate 
(p =  ilm),  and  its level of consumption  (g),  and  allows the lump-sum  tax 
(TI  to  vary so  as  to  satisfy the identity. I  assume  that g is  exogenous  and 
that consumers  take  the  lump-sum  tax as  parametrically given. 
Perfect Foresight Equilibrium 
A  perfect foresight equilibrium is  a sequence  of prices and  quantities for 
which notional  demands  and  supplies  for bonds  and  equities are equal  in the 
present and  the future.  This equi 1 i  brium is  described by  the optimal i  ty 
conditions  C161 -  C201,  the definitions of  8  and r  (expressions  C131  and 
C1411,  and  a material balance constraint (expression  C211). The  consumer's  optimality condition is: 
The  firm's optimality conditions are: 
lim  ptqtKt =  0  =  lim  ptQtbt (Transversality Condition) 




where  pt =  exp 
Expression  C161  states  that the ratio of the marginal  utility  of cash  to 
that of  consumption  equals  the nominal  interest rate.  Expression C171  states 
that the firm  equates  marginal  factor cost with marginal  revenue  product. 
Expression  C181  states  that marginal  q,  the shadow  price of instal  led capital  , 
differs  from one  by  the after-tax decline  in  cash  flow due  to adjustment  costs 
from investing.  Expression  C191  indicates that the  shadow  return from holding 
capital,  q,  plus  the real after-tax increment  to  cash  flow from an  extra unit 
of capital,  (1 - zP)(Fk - TK), must  equal  the required rate of 
return on  capital,  (r  +  6)q.  Expression  C201  is  the first-order condition 
for the debt-equity ratio:  ar/aX =  0.  It is straightforward to show 
that 8  +  p
a  equals  the nominal  interest rate.  Expression  C201  indicates 
that an  increase  in the anticipated inflation rate increases  the debt-equi ty 
ratio.  Expression  C21 I  is the material  balance  constraint. Steady State 
In  the steady  state,  consumption,  the capital  stock,  and  the rate of  inflation 
are  constant.  Thus  the nominal  money  growth rate is constant  and  p
a  =  p = 
ilm;  the anticipated rate of inflation equals  the money  growth rate.  These 
conditions imply that the steady  state can  be  characterized by  the following 
equations : 
Comparative  Statics of  an  Increase  in the Money  Growth  Rate 
Expressions  C241 and  C261 imply,  respectively, 
From  expression  C251 it  is  clear that an  increase  in the money-growth  rate 
increases the steady-state interest rate B  +  p and  induces  a higher 
debt-equity ratio:  axlap  >  0.  Expressions  C251 and  C291 imply 
arlap  <  0.  In  addition,  expression  C231 implies that q returns  to  its original  steady-state  level.  In the long-run,  the capital  stock will increase 
although IIK  will return to 6,  the rate of physical  depreciation of 
capital.  Expression  C281,  together  with aqlap =  0 and  a6Idp =  0, 
implies expression  C301  and  that the capital  stock increases. 
The  Model's Predictions of  Causal  Relations 
Expressions  [231 and  C251  imply,  respectively,  that in the long-run, 
inflation has  no  effect  on  q,  and  that X rises with an  increase  in 
inflation.  In  addition,  in the long run inflation has  no  effect on  IIK  since 
IIK  returns  to  6. 
Absence  of long-run effect  is equivalent  to  structural neutrality.  The 
correspondence  between  the structural neutrality of Xt with respect  to  Y, 
and  the absence  of feedback  from Xt to  Y,  at zero frequency is discussed 
in  Geweke  (1982a). 
The  model  also implies predictions about  instantaneous  causality. 
Expression  C201,  the first-order condition for the debt-equity ratio implies 
that there  wi  11  be  instantaneous  causal i  ty  between  inflation and  the 
debt-equity ratio.  Since nominal  rather than real interest payments  are tax 
deductible for  corporations,  a higher  inflation rate will be  associated with a 
higher debt-equi  ty  ratio.  Expression  C181  imp1  ies instantaneous causal i  ty 
between  q and  IIK.  Expressions  C131,  1191,  and  C201  imply instantaneous 
causality between  inflation and  q,  and  between  inflation and  IIK.  Expression 
C191  can  be  integrated,  subject to  the transversality condition,  to  show  that q,  is equal  to  the present value of  future after-tax marginal  products of 
capital net of  adjustment  costs.  Expression  C201  shows  that the  inflation 
rate,  p
a,  affects the debt-equity ratio and  expression  C131  indicates that 
the debt-equity ratio  affects the cost of capital,  T.  Since  inflation 
affects  r, it  affects q and  thus  IIK. 
Corresponding  to the predictions about  instantaneous causality are 
predictions regarding the absence  of directional feedback.'  There  should be 
no directional  feedback  between  inflation and  X,  between  inflation and  q, 
between  inflation and  IIK, or between  q and  IIK. 
Both Modigliani  and  Cohn  (1979)  and  Summers  (1983)  suggest  that the 
short-run relations between  inflation and  q,  between  inflation and  X,  and 
between  inflation and  IIK  may  differ from their long-run counterparts.  The 
null hypotheses  that there are no  short-run feedbacks from inflation to  X, 
from  inflation to  q,  or from inflation to  IIK  are tested. 
In  addition,  expression  E181,  implies that there is  no  feedback from the 
vector comprised of  X  and  inflation to  the vector comprised of  q and  IIK, 
and  that there is  no instantaneous  feedback  between  the vector comprised of 
X  and  inflation  to  the vector comprised of  q and  IIK. 
Met  hod01 ogy 
Estimation of vector autoregressions  requires a choice of lag length. 
Rather  than choose  one  lag length for the estimation,  several  lag lengths  are 
utilized,  and  the sensitivity of the results with respect  to  the lag length is 
discussed.  Since  the data are quarterly,  lag lengths of 2,  4,  and  8 are used. 
In  order  that the series analyzed be  indeterministic,  constant effects are removed  by regressi  ng  each  seri  es  (A1 nKt , A1 nP t, qt  , and 
A,;  A is  the first  difference operator)  on  a  constant and  before 
analyzing the residuals.  Much  recent work  has  indicated that 
first-differencing is to  be  preferred to  trend-removal  as  a prewhitening 
procedure.  In  particular,  Nelson  and  Kang  (1981)  have  pointed out that 
inclusion of a  time trend rather than first-differencing can  introduce 
'spurious periodicity.'  Kang  (1985)  has  shown  that detrending can  alter the 
results of  Granger  causality tests. 
In  order  to  choose  between  first  differencing and  including trends  in  the 
estimation,  a  test developed  by Dickey and  Fuller (1979)  is  applied.  Each 
series is  regressed on  a  constant,  itself lagged one  period,  and  an  arbitrary 
number  of lagged first  differences.  Fuller (1976)  has  tabulated the 
distribution of  the test statistic for the hypothesis  that there is  a unit 
root.  If that hypothesis  cannot  be  rejected,  the series are differenced  and 
then the test is applied to  the differenced series. 
The  estimates of the overall measures  of  feedback  can  be  evaluated with 
the x2 distribution if the disturbances u,,  u2, v,,  and  v,  in 
expressions  C331  and  C341  are  i.i.d.  There  is  obviously small  sample  bias, 
however,  since by  construction the feedback measures  are nonnegative.  A 
procedure  developed by Geweke  (see  Geweke  C19861,  pp.9-10)  is  employed  to 
adjust the feedback measures  and  their frequency decompostion for small  sample 
bias.  This procedure yields adjusted point estimates  and  60  percent 
confidence  intervals.  The  width of the confidence intervals is chosen  in 
recognition of the small  sample  avai  lable. 
Interpretation of the estimates of feedback  is  difficult for two reasons. 
First,  there is  no clear-cut criterion to  choose  lag length.  Second,  even  the confidence  intervals constructed with the small  sample  adjustment  exceed 
zero.  Thus  it  is  hard  to  test hypotheses  claiming that feedback  is  zero. 
Since  there is no clear-cut criterion available to  choose  lag length,  the 
feedback measures  for different lag lengths  are evaluated.  Ambiguity arising 
from  the necessity of looking at more  than one  lag length is  more  severe  with 
the frequency decompositions  than with regard  to  the overall measures  of 
feedback.  The  unadjusted overall measures  of  feedback  can  be  evaluated with 
the x2(j)  distribution,  where  j is the lag length.  However,  there is  no 
asymptotic distribution theory available with which  to  evaluate  the unadjusted 
estimates of f(X+Y)[wl.  In  addition,  these  estimates  may  fluctuate with 
lag length.  Two  conventions  are adopted  to  deal  with this ambiguity.  First, 
conclusions  valid for all lag lengths  are emphasized.  Second,  the null 
hypothesis  that there is  no feedback  is  rejected only if feedback  is 
significant for all lag lengths. 
Since  there  is  no asymptotic distribution theory available for the 
unadjusted estimates of f(X*Y)Cwl,  confidence intervals constructed with 
the small  sample  bias adjustment  are utilized.  Feedback  is  considered 
significant if the  left-hand endpoint of the confidence  interval is  greater 
than or equal  to .05193.  Thi s level corresponds  to  feedback from X to  Y 
explaining 5  percent of the variance  in  Y. 
For  the overall measures  of feedback,  the x2 statistics for  the 
unadjusted estimates  are presented,  as  well  as  the confidence intervals from 
the small  sample  adj~stment.~  Feedback  will be  considered  significant if 
the x2 statistic is significant at the .90  level and if the left-hand 
endpoint of  the confidence interval exceeds  .05193. Besides  the initial estimates  and  the adjusted estimates  with confidence 
intervals,  the transformations,  1-exp(FCX+YI),  1-exp(FCY+Xl),  and 
1-expCF(X+Y>Cwll  are presented.  These  yield the proportion of  variance  in 
Y explained by  feedback from X  to Y,  the proportion of variance  in  X  explained 
by feedback from Y to  X,  and  the proportion of variance in  Y explained by 
feedback  from X to  Y at frequency o,  respectively.  Only  the results of 
applying these  transformations  to  the adjusted point estimates  is  reported. 
Evaluation of predictions concerning short-run feedback  is  made  difficult 
by  the fact that  'short-run' does  not correspond to  any  particular frequency. 
Frequencies  have  been  chosen  corresponding to  4,  8,  12,  and  16  quarters,  as 
well  as  ten frequencies  that are evenly spaced  between  On  and  1.0~. 
For  the tests of  the q theory (tests of the hypotheses  that:  (1)  q and 
investment  instantaneously cause  each other but do not Granger-cause  each 
other and  that,  (2) the vector comprised of inflation and  the debt-equity 
ratio  does  not cause  the vector comprised of  q and  investment)  only unadjusted 
estimates are reported.  This makes  the results comparable  to  results of 
studies not employing a small  sample  bias adjustment. 
Results 
Based  on  the results of the Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots,  the 
hypotheses  that there are unit roots in  the autoregressive  representations of 
Aln(Kt),  Aln(Pt),  qt,  and  At  cannot  be  rejected.  Once  each of 
these series is differenced,  however,  z(p,)  is  significant,  indicating 
that the series should not be  differenced  again (tabulation of the results of 
these tests are available from the author).  Accordingly,  the measures  of feedback  are estimated with the second  differences of the logarithms of  the 
price level  (AAPt)  and  the capital  stock  (AAK,),  the first 
difference of qt  (Aqt),  and  the first  difference of X,  (AX,). 
Tables  1A  and  1B  pertain to the evaluation of the prediction that,  in  the 
long-run,  an  increase in  inflation has  no effect on  the debt-equity ratio.  In 
Table  lA,  the adjusted estimates of  feedback  from inflation to  q are 
reported.  Table  1B  reports the proportion of  variance  in  Aq  explained by 
feedback  from AAp  to  Aq,  the proportion of  variance in  AAp  explained 
by feedback  from Aq  to  AAp,  and  the frequency decomposition  of the 
proportion of variance  in  Aq  explained by  feedback  from AAp  to  Aq.  It 
is  clear that lag length affects the results.  Inflation is structurally 
neutral with respect to  q with lag lengths of  2 and  4,  but not 8.  Table  28 
indicates that when  the lag length is 8,  feedback  from inflation to  q explains 
over 23  percent of  the long-run variation in  q.  The  comparative  static 
multiplier reported in  Table  7  is negative,  indicating that an  increase in 
inflation decreases  the long-run level of q.  However,  only with a lag length 
of  8 is this decrease  significant according to  the criteria adopted  here. 
The  prediction that an  increase  in  inflation increases  the long-run level 
of the debt-equity ratio is  evaluated with the results reported in  Tables  3A 
and  3B.  There  is  no feedback  with a lag length of  2.  There  is long-run 
feedback  with a lag length of  8,  but not 4.  Long-run  feedback from inflation 
to X explains 25.84  percent of the variation in  the debt-equity ratio with a 
lag length of  8.  From  Table  7  it  is clear that an  increase in  inflation 
increases  the long-run debt-equity ratio with lag lengths of  4 and  8,  but not 
2.  Thus  the only evidence of higher  inflation leading to  significantly higher 
long-run X occurs when  the lag length equals  8. The  results displayed  in  Tables  3A  and  38  indicate that there. is no 
long-run feedback  from inflation to IIK  regardless of lag length. 
The  unadjusted estimates of instantaneous feedback reported in  Table  5 
indicate that at no  lag length is there instantaneous  feedback  between 
inflation and  q,  between  inflation and 1,  orbetween inflation and  IIK.  The 
confidence  intervals based  on  the small  sample  adjustments  confirm this 
conclusion. 
The  results reported in  Tables  2A  and  5  support  the prediction that there 
is no  directional  feedback  between  inflation and 1.  Table  2A  shows  that for 
no lag length is there significant feedback  from inflation to  X  or from X 
to inflation.  This  conclusion also follows from the unadjusted  estimates 
reported in  Table  5.  Tables  1A  and  5 provide mixed  evidence  regarding the 
prediction that there is no  directional feedback between  inflation and  q.  In 
Table  1A we  see  that there  is  no  significant directional  feedback  between 
inflation and  q.  Table  5,  however,  reports  that there is feedback  from 
inflation to  q at the  .900  level with lag lengths of 4  or 8.  Tables  3A  and  5 
provide mixed  evidence regarding the prediction that there is no  directional 
feedback between  inflation and  IIK.  In  Table  3A,  we  see  that there  is no 
directional feedback between  inflation and  IIK, except  with a lag length of 
8.  Inflation Granger-causes  IIK  when  the  lag length is  8.  According to  Table 
5,  this feedback  is significant at the  .900  level. 
The  x2 statistics for the unadjusted measures  of directional feedback 
between  q and  IIK  are reported in  Table  7.  Tobin's q causes  IIK  at the  .975 
level for all lag lengths.  IIK  does  not cause  q.  The  prediction that there 
is  no directional feedback  between  q and  IIK is not supported by  the data. Evaluating predictions regarding the short-run is  difficult since 
'short-run'  does  not correspond  to  a particular frequency.  If 'short-run' 
means  less than 8  quarters,  then  there is  feedback from inflation to  X  (see 
Table  2A).  At  10,  12,  16,  or 20  quarters,  however,  there is feedback  with a 
lag length of 8.  Similar results apply to the inflation-q  relation.  Table  2A 
indicates that there is  no feedback from inflation to q at less than 10 
quarters with any  lag length.  There  is  feedback  at all periodicities 
exceeding 10  quarters when  the lag length is 8.  Essentially the same  results 
hold for the  inflation-IIK  relation.  Inflation causes  IIK  only with a  lag 
length of  8  and  at periodicities of at least 8  quarters. 
The  results reported in  Table  6  indicate that there is feedback  from the 
vector comprised of  X  and  inflation to  the vector comprised of  q  and  IIK 
only when  the lag length is  8  and  the significance level  is .90.  At  all lag 
lengths,  there is  instantaneous feedback between  the vector  comprised of  X 
and  inflation to  the vector comprised of q  and  IIK. 
Conclusions 
It  cannot  be  concluded  that inflation has  long-run effects on  financial 
markets.  Only with a  lag length of 8  are there long-run effects on  q  and 
1.  Regardless of lag length,  inflation has  no  long-run impact on investment. 
It  also cannot  be  concluded  that there are instantaneous feedbacks  between 
inflation  and  q,  X,  or IIK.  Only with a  lag length of 8  is there short-run 
feedback  from inflation to q  or IIK.  Regardless of lag length,  inflation has 
no short-run impact  on  A. Since the findings could be  characterized as  showing  that the variables 
examined  are  simply unrelated,  Tables  5  and  6 report the x2  statistics for 
the unadjusted estimates of the measures  of linear dependence.  The  measure  of 
linear dependence  F(X,Y),  is the sum  of F(X+Y),  F(Y+X),  and  F(X*Y). 
F(X,Y)  equals  zero only if  X  and  Y are uncorrelated at all leads  and  lags. 
Tables  5  and  6  report the xZ  statistics for the estimated measures  of 
linear dependence.  For  almost  all the relations investigated  there is linear 
dependence  at the  .900  level.  Only for the inflation-X  relation at a lag 
length of 4  is there no  linear dependence. 
The  long-run decline in  q found  when  the lag length is  8 may  be  explained 
by  the omission of tax effects from  the empirical  analysis.  Feldstein (1980) 
claimed  that biases  in  the tax laws  may  have  impaired investment  in 
inflationary periods.  Jorgenson and  Sul 1  ivan (1  981  showed  that higher 
inflation would  increase  the effective corporate tax rate under  the tax  laws 
prevailing from 1946  to  1980.  Thus  it  could be  that T,,  the corporate tax 
rate,  did not remain constant over  the sample  period.  It is  clear from  the 
first  order condition for investment,  expression  E231,  that an  increase  in 
T,  results in  a lower  long-run q but produces  no  long-run change  in  IIK. 
The  presence  of  feedback  from inflation to  q and  IIK  with some  lag lengths, 
however,  cannot easily be  explained by  the omission of  tax effects. If  taxes 
affect q or IIK  but not inflation,  then  the unconditional measure  of  feedback 
from  inflation to  q or IIK  would be  upwardly  biased (see  Geweke  C1982bI). 
Upward  bias in  the estimates of  feedback  from inflation to  q  or IIK  would 
result if taxes  affected inflation but not q  or IIK.  This latter scenario 
seems  unl i  kel  y. One  possible source of  measurement  error is the use  of  actual  inflation 
rather than expected  inflation.  McCallum  (1984)  has  emphasized  that,  even  in 
the long-run,  expectations may  not equal  realizations.  In  Tables  4A,  48,  and 
5, I  provide evidence  regarding  the causal  relations among  actual  inflation 
(measured  with the CPIU)  and  expected  inflation.  The  expectations series is 
from the Michigan Survey of  Households  and  represents  the expected rate of 
change  of the CPIU  over  the next 12  months.  At  low  frequencies,  feedback  from 
actual  inflation to  expected  inflation accounts  for a substantial portion of 
the variation in  actual  inflation.  This is  a rough  indication that the 
bivariate relations of inflation and  q,  inflation and  A,  and  inflation and 
IIK  are more  likely to  correspond  to  relations involving expected  inflation  at 
low  than at high frequencies. 
Another  possible source of  measurement  error is the difficulty in 
measuring the denominator of  q,  the replacement value of the stock of  physical 
capital.  If measurement  errors are uncorrelated with true variables at  all 
leads and  lags,  the existence of  measurement  error will result in  an 
understatement of  the overall measure  of  linear dependence.  The  effect  on 
individual  feedback measures  is generally ambiguous. 
Overall,  the results cast doubt on  the usefulness of the q theory.  There 
is instantaneous causality between  the pairs;  q-I/K  and  inflation-A, but not 
between q and  IIK.  Both of these results and  the finding that q 
Granger-causes  IIK  are inconsistent with the q theory.  The  results are also 
inconsistent with the view that changes  in  inflation induce firms to  vary 
their debt-equity ratios so as  to  minimize the cost of capital.  Inflation 
doesn't influence  the debt-equity ratio in  either the  short-  or long-run. Suggestions  for Future Research 
Before further analyzing the relations examined  in this paper,  it  is 
necessary  to  explain the generally low levels of  feedback.  Use  of  actual 
expectations data may  reduce measurement  error.  If this can  be  accomplished, 
then it  may  be  worthwhile to  introduce taxes  in  the empirical analysis. 
The  failure of  q to  incorporate  all information contained in  current 
values of inflation and  the debt-equity ratio suggests  further research on  the 
influence of  financial structure and  inflation on  q.  One  possible avenue  of 
research would be  to  incorporate financial structure into a model  such  as 
Fischer's (1983)  where  q Granger-causes  IIK  due  to  lags in  the investment 
process. 
Development of  a structural model  capable of  explaining the results may  be 
fruitful.  A useful  guide to  such  work may  be  found in the signs of  the 
comparative statics multipliers reported in  Table  7.  In  the long-run,  an 
increase  in inflation increases the debt-equity ratio, decreases  q,  and 
increases  IIK.  In  addition,  an  increase in  q  leads  to  an  increase in  IIK  and 
an  increase in IIK  leads  to  a decrease  in  q.  Inflation is  lowered by 
increases  in  either IIK  or 1.  An  increase in  q increases  inflation.  Not 
all of  these  effects,  of course,  are statistically significant. Glossary of Terms 
C t  =  real private consumption 
P  t  =  the price level  • 
P  t  =  rate of change  of  P;  p =  PIP. 
P:  =  instantaneous  anticipated rate of inflation 
B  t  =  nominal  corporate  bonds 
b  t  =  real corporate bonds;  bt =  Bt/Pt 
M t  =  nominal  money  balances 
m  t  =  real balances;  rn,  =  MtlPt 
I3  =  rate of time preference 
W t  =  real wage  rate 
4 t  =  real employment 
St  =  nominal  interest rate on  corporate bonds 
Div,  =  real dividends 
d  t  =  dividend payout  rate;  dt =  Divt/ztEt 
Z t  =  relative price of  equity in  terms  of  output 
E t  =  the number  of shares  of  equity 
8  =  the rate of  return on  consumption;  8 =  I3  - u~~EIu~ 
It  =  real investment  expenditures 
Kt  =  real stock of  physical  capital 
r  =  the cost of capital as  derived in  the text 
Y  t  =  the cash  flow of the firm 
Yt  =  real output 
nt  =  real gross profits 
Y(I,K> =  real adjustment  cost from investment 
-C  P  =  corporate profits tax rate 
RE t  =  retained earnings 
1  t  =  the debt  to  equity ratio;  X  =  b1zE 
a(X>b  =  cost of  maintaining the bond  portfolio 
6  =  the rate of  depreciation of  the physical  capital stock 
T  =  the lump  sum  tax 
g  =  real government  expenditure on  goods 
q t  =  shadow  price of  physical  capital  (Tobin's  q> 
Il t  =  the growth rate of  real balances;  p =  film Footnotes 
'  This  treatment of the effect of  inflation on firm  value follows that of 
Modigliani and  Cohn  (1979).  They  rationalize the appearance  of  such  a term by 
equating it  with the repayment  of the principal made  possible by  inflation. 
Note  that,  from expressions  C121,  C131,  and  C141,  the value of the firm is 
unaffected by  inflation in  the absence  of  a deduction for nominal  interest 
payments. 
The  absence  of lagged values  in  the first-order conditions  imp1  ies that 
past values  should not help predict,  given current values.  Suppose  that an 
unanticipated change  in the corporate tax rate immediately  increased q  and 
I/K.  Immediately  after the shock,  past values  of q  and  I/K would  not reflect 
the new  information contained  in  current q.  Thus,  current q could be  expected 
to add  to  the ability of  past q  and  past  I/K to  predict I/K. 
Suppose  that both q  and  I/K have  been  increasing as  K rises.  Given 
perfect foresight,  at each  point in  time  the level of q is sufficient to 
predict I/K.  Thus,  past values of I/K will not help predict I/K,  given past 
values of  q.  Past  values of I/K contain the same  information as  past q,  and 
thus  past q should  not add  to  the ability  of  past I/K to  predict IIK. 
The  x2  statistics for the original point estimates  are provided to 
facilitate comparison of these results with the results of  research  conducted 
without the benefit of  a small  sample  bias adjustment. 
4  Ideally, I  would report confidence  intervals for the (nonlinear) 
transformations of the feedback measures.  Here,  however, I  report the results 
of  applying the nonlinear  transformation to  the confidence  intervals.  The  two 
types of confidence  intervals,  of  course,  need  not be  the same. Data 
All data are quarterly and  seasonally adjusted for nonfinancial 
corporations  (NFCs)  from  the first  quarter of  1952  through  the fourth  quarter 
of  1  984. 
q:  The  q series through  1976  is from Von  Furstenberg  (1977).  Von 
Furstenberg has  supplied me  with data from 1977  through 1984. I  have  removed 
the replacement value of land from the denominator.  Von  Furstenberg  (1977) 
provides  a detailed description of his calculation of q. 
1: The  debt-equity ratio is the market  value of interest bearing 
financial liabilities divided by  the market  value of  equity.  Both  series are 
from Von  Furstenberg. 
P:  I  utilize the GNP  deflator published by  the Bureau  of  Economic 
Analysis  (BEA). 
K:  The  real net capital  stock  is calculated by  the perpetual  inventory 
formula:  Kt =  Kt-,  +  (1-6)It-,.  I  calculate series for structures and 
equipment  separately and  add  the two  together.  For  each  series, I  utilize the 
end-of-1951  and  end-of-1984 constant dollar net stock figures for NFCs  (BEA) 
and  the constant dollar gross  expenditure  series, It  (billions of 1967 
dollars,  also from BEA).  Given  the end-of-1951 stock and  the gross  investment 
series,  my  estimate of  S  yields the actual  end-of-1984  stock via the 
perpetual  inventory formula.  The  constant  dollar net investment series  is 
(1-&>It where It  is the gross  investment  series.  For  conformity with 
the Von  Furstenberg data, I  center the capital stock  series on the middle of 
each quarter. Explanations of  Tables  1A  - 7 
For  all estimates,  the number  of observations is  131 - lag length. 
Tables  lA,  2A,  3A,  and  4A  report the estimated measures  of  feedback 
adjusted for small  sample  bias as  discussed in  Geweke  (1986,  pp.  9-10).  The 
left-hand and  right-hand end  points of the 60% confidence intervals are listed 
under  the columns  labelled "20%" and  "80%" respectively.  For  the 
decomposition of feedback  from  X to  Y by frequency,  the column  labelled "w" 
indicates the frequency in  radians at which  the feedback  is  evaluated  (Oq to 
1.0%)  and  the column  labelled "2~1~"  indicates the corresponding 
periodicity in  quarters. 
Tables  lB,  28,  38,  and  4B  report transformations of the point estimates 
presented in  tables  1A,  2A,  3A,  and  4A  respectively.  These  transformations 
are  : 
1)  1-expCF(X+Y)I,  which equals  the percentage  of  variation in  Y 
explained by  feedback from X to Y; 
2)  1-expCF(Y+X)I,  which equals  the percentage  of  variation in  X 
explained by feedback from Y to X;  and 
3)  1-exp(fCX+YICwl),  which equals  the percentage of variation in  Y at 
frequency w  explained by feedback from X to  Y  at  frequency W. 
Table  5  reports the x2  statistics for  the unadjusted point estimates of 
F(X+Y),  F(Y+X),  and  F(X*Y)  when  the X-Y  pairs are:  1)  inflation and  q; 
2)  inflation  and  X;  3)  inflation and  IIK; and  4)  the actual rate of change 
of  the CPIU  and  the expected rate of change  of the CPIU. 
Table  6  presents  the x2  statistics for the feedback measures  for  the tests 
of the q  theory.  The  X-Y  pairs in  this table are:  1)  IIK  and  q;  and  2)  the 
vector comprised of q  and  IIK  and  the vector comprised of X and  inflation. 
Table  7  reports the comparative statics multipliers for the bivariate 
autoregressions of  q and  inflation, X and  inflation,  and  IIK  and  inflation, 
respectively. Table  1A 
Estimates of  Feedback: 









2  Lags  4  Lags 
(20%)  (80%)  (20%)  (  80%) 
8  Lags 
(20%) Table 1B 
Transformations 
of 
Point Estimates in  Table 2A 
Lags  : Table  2A 
Estimates  of  Feedback: 
Inflation and  the Debt-Equity Ratio 
Xt:  AAln(Pt) 
Yt:  AXt 
2  Lags  4  Lags  8  Lags 
(20%)  (80%)  (20%)  (80%)  (20%)  (80%) Table 28 
Transformations 
of 
Point Estimates in  Table 3A 
Xt:  AAln(Pt> 
Yt:  AXt 
Lags : 
A 
1-expC-F(X+Y)I Table  3A 
Estimates of Feedback: 
Inflation and  IIK 
2  Lags 
(20%)  (80%) 
4  Lags 
(20%)  (80%) 
8 Lags 
(20%)  (80%) Table  38 
Transformations 
of 
Point Estimates  in Table  4A 
Lags : Table  4A 
Estimates of Feedback: 
Actual  and  Expected  Rates of Change  of the CPIU 
Xt:  Admp, 
Yt:  Admpf 
2  Lags  4  Lags  8  Lags 
(20%)  (80%)  (20%)  (80%)  (20%)  (80%) 
A 
f(X+Y> Cwl Table  48 
Transformations 
of 
Poidt Estimates  in  Table  5A 
Lags : Table  5 
x2 Statistics for the Unadjusted Estimates of Feedback 
x t  y t 
Lags :  2  4  8 
*,  **,  ***,  **** :  significant at the  .900,  .950,  .975,  .990  levels, 
respectively Table  6 
Lags : 
x2  Stati  sti  cs  for Estimates of  Feedback: 
Tests of the q-theory 
*  :  significant at the  .900  level 
**  : significant at the  .950  level  *** :  significant at the  .975  level  ****:  significant at the  .990  level Table 7 
Comparative Statics Multipliers 
Comparative Statics Multipliers for Inflation-q: 
lag  length:  2  4  8 
inflationjq:  -1.9799  -8.2491  -15.6383 
qjinflation:  0.0044  0.01  36  0.0088 
Comparative Statics Multipliers for Inflation-A: 
lag length:  2  4  8 
inflation*X  -0.0459  4.3536  12.6364 
binflation  -0.0072  0.0014  0.01  19 
Comparative Statics Multipliers for Inflation-IIK: 
lag  length:  2  4  8 
inflation+IlK  0.0226  0.0259  0.0618 
IlK+inflation  0.7440  1.4200  2.0311 References 
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